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Introduction
In the UK, closed-end funds (CEF) are an asset class which has often been overlooked by investors, who mainly focus on open-end funds. Nevertheless, particularly for retail investors, closed-end funds provide an attractive investment alternative to open-end funds, as fees are often substantially lower. Restrictions on advertising and a less favorable commission structure for financial advisors are reasons why closed-end funds have remained a niche market in the UK asset management industry. Investors in closed-end funds also have to consider changes in the discount, whereby the net asset value (NAV) of the fund and the price of the fund can diverge substantially -hence, the need to distinguish between the NAV return, which measures the performance of the fund manager, and the fund-price return to the investor.
Research on closed-end funds in the UK and US, has focused mainly on causes of the discount (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 1990; Gemmill and Thomas 2002) ; relatively few studies focus on the performance of these funds and no studies (to our knowledge) have used closed-end funds to separate skill from luck by applying the false discovery rate (FDR). The impact of 'luck' in multiple hypothesis tests arises whenever we ask the question: 'How many of our statistically significant results are likely to be 'truly null?' -that is 'false discoveries'. In this paper we use the false discovery rate which measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds, whose performance has been found to be statistically significant. We assess the alphaperformance of the UK closed-end funds over the period November 1990 to January 2013 using a monthly data set, free of survivorship bias. If we simply count the number of funds which are found to have a statistically significant performance measure, we run the risk of including funds which are truly null (i.e. Type I errors). For example, suppose the FDR amongst 20 statistically significant positive-alpha funds is 80%, then this implies that only 4 funds (out of the 20) have truly significant alphas -this is clearly useful information for investors. A key issue is whether this correction gives different inferences from the standard approach of simply 'counting' the number of significant funds with non-zero abnormal performance.
Another important element in performance measurement is the factor model used. We assess individual fund performance using self-declared benchmarks. However, noting that there may be style drift (Sensoy 2009), we augment this one-factor model with global factors related to size, value, and momentum. No other studies, to our knowledge, attempt to measure closed-end fund performance using the funds' self-declared benchmarks.
We also address the issue of performance persistence. We sort funds into (decile) portfolios based on a number of different metrics which capture the skill of the fund manager (i.e. NAV performance). The portfolios are frequently rebalanced and we then assess the subsequent alpha-performance. This recursive portfolio approach is analysed for a number of different portfolio formation rules and factor models.
From a total of 330 UK closed-end funds, our final sample of around 300 funds over the period November 1990 to January 2013 provides a large comprehensive data set (largely free of survivorship bias). This paper contributes to the literature by assessing individual-fund performance relative to its self-declared benchmark (as well as other risk factors) and adjusts the number of statistically significant alphas for the presence of false discoveries. For individual fund performance we find that around 75% of funds neither statistically beat nor are inferior to their benchmarks -this applies across all three factor models used. Next, there is a much higher proportion of false discoveries among the worst (negative alpha) funds than amongst the best performing funds -so the standard method of simply counting the number of funds with 'significant' test statistics can be far more misleading for 'losers' than for 'winners'. Third, the truly significant positive-alpha and negative-alpha funds appear to be concentrated in the extreme tails of the cross-section of fund performance.
For persistence in performance, we find that sorting into decile portfolios on past performance produces some positive post-sort alphas using fund-price returns in a one-factor model but many more statistically significant post-sort alphas when using a four-factor model.
Previous Studies
Before examining the literature on the performance of CEF, it is worth briefly commenting on results from open-end funds. The literature on US open-end-fund performance is voluminous with less work being done on UK funds; most studies examine funds that invest domestically. It is well documented that the average US or UK open-end equity fund underperforms its benchmarks (Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka 1993; Fletcher 1997; Blake and Timmermann 1998; Wermers 2000; Quigley and Sinquefield 2000) . However, the cross-section standard deviation of alphas for individual funds in both the UK and US is high, and while some studies do find a few funds with statistically significant positive alphas, many more funds record negative alphas (Malkiel 1995; Kosowski, Timmermann, White and Wermers 2006; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O'Sullivan 2008; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O'Sullivan 2012, Fama and French 2010,) . (Khorana 1996 (Khorana , 2001 Bessler, Blake, Luckoff, and Tonks 2010) -all of which in turn may affect future performance. At the other end of the spectrum, poorly performing funds are subject to 'external governance' (fund outflows) and 'internal governance' (manager changes) which also influence their future performance (Dangl, Wu and Zechner 2008; Bessler et al. 2010 ).
Closed-end funds, unlike open-end funds, are never forced to liquidate securities or purchase additional securities due to fund inflows and outflows. Instead, changes in demand for the fund lead to a widening or narrowing of the discount and hence changes in investors' returns.
Persistence in the performance may therefore be stronger than for open-end funds because sentiment in favour of a closed-end fund might lead to an increased demand for the fund by additional (retail) investors which, with a given fund size, may lead to higher future fund returns.
In contrast, an increase in demand for a particular open-end fund will be met by an increased inflow and increased purchases across a wide range of stocks, where the future price impact may be relatively small. CEF's can also invest in illiquid securities (Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton 2009) and use leverage (Elton, Gruber, Blake, and Shachar 2013) -this may also result in more positive alphas and performance persistence of active strategies, than for open-end funds.
The literature on closed-end fund performance in the US and UK is relatively sparse.
Bers and Madura (2000), using US funds with a domestic mandate, find evidence of positive persistence for NAV and fund-price returns, based on the correlation between estimated alphas in successive periods. Positive persistence is also found for US funds with a foreign mandate although the level of persistence is less than that for domestic funds (Madura and Bers 2002).
More recently, Elyasiani and Jia (2011) evaluate fund-price and NAV persistence using 86 US equity funds. They find, however, evidence of only very weak persistence when the funds are evaluated against median risk-adjusted industry performance.
In the UK, Bangassa (1999) finds no evidence of individual funds with positive alphas and little evidence of positive alphas when funds are grouped into 10 investment styles. Using daily data on 9 portfolios with both domestic and international mandates, Bangassa, Su, and Joseph (2012) find mixed evidence on alpha performance which depends upon the investment mandate and the factor model used.
In this paper we add to the literature by assessing the performance of individual UK closed-end funds using their self-declared benchmarks (and other risk factors) after adjusting for false discoveries. We also examine performance persistence using different sorting rules and different factor models for post-formation returns. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the methodology behind the FDR and other methods of controlling for false positives in a multiple testing framework. In section 3 we look at performance models, in section 4 we present our empirical results; section 5 concludes.
The False Discovery Rate
The standard approach to determining whether the alpha of a single fund demonstrates skill or luck is to choose a rejection region and associated significance level and to reject the null of 'no outperformance' if the test statistic lies in the rejection region -'luck' is interpreted as the significance level chosen. However, using  = 5% when testing the alphas for each of M-funds, the probability of finding at least one non-zero alpha-fund in sample of M-funds is much higher than 5% (even if all funds have true alphas of zero). 1 Put another way, if we find 20 out of 200 funds (i.e. 10% of funds) with significant positive estimated alphas when using a 5% significance level then some of these will merely be lucky.
In testing the performance of many funds a balanced approach is needed -one which is not too conservative but allows a reasonable chance of identifying those funds with truly differential performance. An approach known as the false discovery rate (FDR) attempts to strike this balance by classifying funds as 'significant' (at a chosen significance level) and then asks the question 'What proportion of these significant funds are false discoveries?' -that is, those that are truly null (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995; Storey 2002; Storey, Taylor, and Siegmund 2004) .
The FDR measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds which have been found to have significant (individual) alphas and hence 'measures' luck among the pool of 'significant funds '. Storey (2002) and Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) provide a detailed account of the FDR methodology, so it is only briefly summarized below. The null hypothesis that fund-i has no skill in security selection (alpha) and the alternative of either positive or negative performance is: 1 This probability is the compound type-I error. For example, if the M tests are independent then Pr(at least 1 false discovery) = 1 -(1- ) M = zM , which for a relatively small number of M=50 funds and conventional  = 0.05 gives zM = 0.92 -a high probability of observing at least one false discovery. 
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Performance Models Individual Fund Performance
The performance of individual closed-end funds can be measured using either fund-price returns or NAV returns -the latter measuring the performance of the manager of the fund and the former measuring the return to the investor. The difference between these two measures of performance is the change in the closed-end fund discount.
Our performance models are well known 'factor models' and therefore are only described briefly below. When considering the performance of individual fund excess returns we make use of the self-declared benchmark return of the fund (in excess of the risk-free rate), Alternative bootstrapping procedures such as simultaneously bootstrapping the residuals and the independent variables, or allowing for serial correlation (block bootstrap) or contemporaneous bootstrap across all (existing) funds at time t, produced qualitatively similar results, hence we only report results for the 'residuals only' bootstrap. 
Data and Empirical Results
The sample comprises 298 closed-end equity funds traded on the London Stock In cases where the fund declares a particular benchmark, the choice is clear-cut.
However in many cases, and particularly early in the sample period, funds did not declare a particular benchmark. In these cases, a benchmark is selected that best matched the investment mandate of the individual fund. Thus, for example, the benchmark selected for Medicx plc -a this is close to the entire universe of 330 UK closed-end funds. Table 1 reports summary statistics for NAV and fund-price returns over the sample period. Three alternative models are used -the excess return benchmark model (ERBM), the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM).
[ Results for fund-price returns are, for the most part, broadly similar to those for NAV returns although the number of statistically significant positive alphas is smaller while there are no negative alphas. The signs on the three factors are the same as those for the NAV returns but the factor loadings are larger. The average 2 R using fund-price returns is lower than when using NAV returns -implying that the four factors fail to pick up all the variation in the discount. The main difference between the NAV and the fund-price regressions is that the former give negative average alphas whereas the latter give a positive average alpha for the 1FBM (0.36% p.a.) and 4FBM (1.53% p.a.). All three models for individual CEF returns have about 60-70% of funds with (statistically significant) non-normal residuals (Bera-Jarque test, at 5% significance level) -thus motivating the use of bootstrap procedures in testing fund performance.
To obtain further insight into the importance of the risk factors in explaining the performance of the average fund, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of all the funds and examine the recursive parameter estimates for the NAV and fund-price returns.
[ Table 2 here]
For the one-factor global model (1FGM), the average alpha is positive but statistically insignificant for both NAV and fund-price returns (Table 2 alphas, but there is a small proportion of funds with statistically positive or negative alphas. We now examine the location of these non-zero alpha funds.
As we increase the significance level  , the number of statistically significant positive alpha funds S   ( 
 
), rather than being evenly spread throughout the tails.
6 As noted below, the results using different models to estimate 0  are qualitatively similar.
[ Table 3  is equal to 86.5% for ERBM and 79.0% for 1FBM (Table 4 , Panels A and B).
[ Table 4 here]
Across the three models a salient feature is the resultant fall in FDR Turning now to negative-alpha funds, we find that as we move from the Excess Return Benchmark Model (EBRM) to the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM in Table 4 ) and then to the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM in Table 3 ), the number of truly negative skilled funds ( (se= 1.6%) for the 4FGM -hence although the point estimates differ they are both statistically 7 This issue was raised by an anonymous referee. equal to zero. In addition, using the self-declared benchmarks gives an average 2 R of 66.6% (across all funds) while using the common global benchmark has an average 2 R of 52.2%.
Persistence in Portfolios of CEF
Using NAV returns, we have established that there is some positive and some negative manager skill in security selection (alpha) when holding individual funds over the whole sample period. We now wish to examine whether forming portfolios by switching between different funds gives a positive-alpha performance in the post-formation period.
We form portfolios using a rolling window based on either the excess benchmark return model (EBRM) or on past t-alphas from the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) -using NAV returns (ie. based on individual manager skill over the formation period). Our performance measure is based on fund-price returns in the post-formation period. 8 We report results for postformation alphas using a formation period of 12 f  months and for alternative holding periods h = 12, 3, 1 months. Because the post-formation portfolios contain funds with different investment objectives, it is not possible to estimate a post-formation factor model which incorporates all the self-declared benchmarks. Hence, we use the one-and four-factor global models to assess the post-formation alphas (for fund-price returns).
Post-formation decile-sorted portfolio alphas, together with their bootstrap p-values are reported for funds sorted by the excess benchmark return model (EBRM) in Table 5 and by the talpha of the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) in Table 6 [ Table 5 here] Funds Sorted using EBRM When we sort funds based on the excess benchmark return model (EBRM) and evaluate the post-formation alphas for fund-price returns using the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM in Table 5 , Panel A), we find about 4 out of the 10 decile portfolios have statistically significant postformation alphas (at a 5% significance level) but there is no clear pattern of past 'winners' remaining 'winners', except when we use , (12,1) fh  when there is persistence in winner funds for deciles 1 to 3. When evaluating the post-formation alphas using the three-factor global model (3FGM in Panel B) or four-factor global model (4FGM in Panel C), we find more positive post-formation alphas for all deciles and for all three combinations of ( , ) fh.
When moving from the one-factor global model (IFGM) to the four-factor global model (4FGM), the increase in the number of decile portfolios with statistically significant positive postformation alphas is partly due to a reduction in residual variance (indicated by an increase in of around 10% for each decile portfolio) and also to an increase in the point estimates of postformation alphas. With the standard errors of the alphas remaining largely constant, the latter leads to an increase in the statistical significance of the decile portfolio alphas.
[ Table 6 here]
Funds Sorted using t-alpha of 1FBM
The same pattern of results reported above, applies when funds are sorted on the t-alpha of the one-factor benchmark model (rather than EBRM) and evaluated using the global models (Table 6 , Panels A, B, and C).
Irrespective of whether we form portfolios based on excess returns over fund-specific self-declared benchmarks EBRM (Table 5) or on the t-alphas of the one-factor benchmark model (Table 6) This applies for all three rebalancing periods h = 1,3, and 12 months. 9 These results are in contrast to those reported for the UK and US open-end fund industry using a four-factor model where there is little evidence of positive post-formation alphas and much stronger evidence negative post-formation alphas.
Funds Sorted using t-alpha of 4FBM
As a further robustness test we take account of the fact that for closed-end funds, pricereturns (to the investor) may exhibit greater momentum than for mutual funds -since the premium or discount may persist (and this is not reflected in NAV returns). We therefore form portfolios of funds based on the t-alpha of the 4FBM (ie. including a momentum variable) using price-returns and use the 4FGM (with price-returns) as in table 6, to measure the post-formation 9 Recursive least squares analysis of the post-formation alphas reveals that it is only post-2001 that the alphas are statistically significant.
R
performance. We again find a substantial number of positive-alpha decile portfolios in the postformation period (table 7) 10 .
[ Table 7 here]
Which performance model should we use? For the four-factor global model, all four factors in the post-formation regressions are statistically significant for all deciles and the 's of 70%-75% suggest that these global factors capture most of the variability in fund-price portfolio returns. Whether the four-factor global model is the 'correct' model for closed-end funds could be debated but, for example, the four factors explain more of the variation in closed-end fund returns than do factor models applied to hedge fund returns -where positive alpha performance is also found. As both hedge funds and closed-end funds can hold heterogeneous portfolios and use leverage (whereas open-end funds cannot), this provides one possible reason for the positive post-formation alphas for closed-end funds.
Conclusion
We use the false discovery rate to assess the overall alpha-performance of UK closedend funds using self-declared benchmarks and additional risk factors. We find evidence that around 16% of the funds in our sample have truly positive alphas (using a four-factor model that includes a self-designated benchmark or where the latter is replaced by a global benchmark).
The number of truly negative alpha funds is around 1-4% of our sample of funds and is largely invariant to the factor model used. This is a better performance overall than UK and US openend funds where around 0%-5% of the positive alpha funds and 25% of the negative alpha funds are found to be statistically significant.
Examining persistence in performance, we find that positive post-formation alpha fund performance depends on the factor model used -there is some positive-alpha performance when post-formation returns are evaluated using a one-factor global market model but substantial positive-alpha performance is found when using a four-factor global model. The magnitude of the alpha increases as global risk factors proposed by Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) are included in our factor model. If we accept the four-factor global model, then decile portfolios of closed-end funds give rise to positive post-formation alphas and fund performance more 10 This variant was suggested by an anonymous referee. We also find qualitatively similar results when we form portfolios of funds based on the t-alpha of the four-factor global model 4FGM using price-returns (rather than the 4FBM) and also use the 4FGM (with price-returns) in the post-formation period (as in tables 6 and 7) -these results are available from the authors. There are 292 funds with an average of 154 monthly observations for NAV returns and 298 funds with an average of 152 monthly observations for fund-price returns. We report averages of the individual fund statistics for both NAV returns and fund-price returns using 3 models, The models are the excess benchmark return model (EBRM), the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM) and the four-factor benchmark model (4FBM) which includes the self-declared fund benchmark and global factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum). Newey-West heteroscedastic and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are reported. The percentage of funds with non-normal residuals is based on the Bera-Jarque B-J statistic. Statistical significance is at the 5% significance level (two tail test). Funds are sorted into past 'winner' and 'loser' deciles using NAV returns and the Excess Benchmark Returns Model. The table reports alphas (and bootstrap p-values) for post-formation fund-price returns using the one-factor global model (1FGM, Panel A), the three-factor global model (3FGM, Panel B) and the four-factor global model (4FGM, Panel C). The formation (f) and holding (h) periods (f,h) are 12/12, 12/6 and 12/1 months. The 1FGM uses the excess return on a global stock market index, the 3FGM also includes global factors for size and book-to-market; the 4FGM adds a momentum variable. The investment horizon is 17 years (204 months), starting in January 1996 and ending in December 2012. Funds are sorted into past 'winner' and 'loser' deciles using NAV returns and the one-factor benchmark model (1FBM). The table reports 
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